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ance. However, if this were the case, there would be an increased probability
that the union would be found to have breached its duty of fair representation.
Furthermore, the employee would not be prevented from suing the employer
for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. Claimant could oppose the
exhaustion defense because he could now show that the union thwarted him
in violation of its duty of fair representation.
V. CONCLUSION
In the interests of preserving the union's statutory role as bargaining
representative, the Supreme Court has severely limited the individual's rights
in grievance processing. As a result of the Court's pronouncements in Vaca v.
Sipes, it is possible that a wrongfully discharged employee may be stripped of
his job and left without judicial relief. It is interesting to note that the majority
of the Vaca Court was seemingly unconcerned with these untoward conse-
quences. Only Justice Black expressed alarm: "[This decision] . . . puts an
intolerable burden on employees with meritorious grievances and means they
will 'frequently be left with no remedy."'1 34
GARY H FrINBERG
THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES:
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses" of a business shall be deductible. Personal
expenses1 and capital expenditures2 are clearly not deductible, although the
latter are generally depreciable under section 167 of the Code. Whether a par-
ticular cost item is a business expense rather than a personal or capital expendi-
ture is a frequently litigated question, and is the primary issue in the present
concern over educational expense deductions. Although some courts have
characterized expenses for educational pursuits as personal, 8 other courts
have stated that such expenses are similar to capital expenditures 4 and have
denied deductibility on that ground while refusing to allow capital depreciation
and amortization.
5
134. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 210.
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 262.
2. Id. § 263.
3. E.g., Jack B. Wheatland, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 579 (1964); Daniel Kates, 21
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1396 (1962).
4. E.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Richard H. Lampkin, 11 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 576 (1952); James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603 (1944).
5. See, e.g., Huene v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Nathaniel
A. Denman, 7 CCH 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 1 7419 (June 26, 1967).
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In 1958 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue promulgated a set of
regulations in an attempt to provide formal guidelines for the deductibility of
educational expenses. 6 In 1967, the Commissioner substituted a new set of regu-
lations.1 In both sets, however, expenditures which reflected what appeared to
be a capital nature, as well as a personal nature, were denied deductibility.
Thus, what is often clearly a business expenditure is denied any deduction,
either through amortization over the life of the "asset" or as a business expense.
This failure to provide such a deduction in any form has created the desperate
attempts to invoke section 162 for expenses the regulations have clearly ex-
cluded, and which may closely resemble capital assets.8 This comment is an
attempt to analyze both sets of regulations and evaluate their consistency with
general policy underlying business deductions.
II. GENERAL REQUREMENTS FOR A SECTION 162 DEDUCTION
A. Introduction
All business expenses, educational or otherwise, in order to qualify for the
section 162 deduction, must meet a number of specific conditions. It is from
these that both sets of regulations have apparently been derived. They are
considered here only briefly as a background for the discussion of the regula-
tions and case law that follows.
B. Business Rather Than Personal or Capital Expenditure
Whether a particular expense is a business, personal or capital expenditure
is often as difficult as it is basic. Education is a particularly troublesome subject
in this area, since it, in most cases, is necessarily able to serve more than one
goal. While it may improve one's business skill, it also may increase one's
general knowledge or qualify one for a specialty or even a new trade; while
the latter results may not have been intended by the taxpayer, he cannot
prevent them. Section 162 allows deductions for all ordinary and necessary
business expenses. However, personal expenses are not deductible thereunder.
For example, in Smith v. Commissioner9 it was found that the cost of a baby-
sitter was a personal expense, even though a baby-sitter was required only
because the mother was employed. The mother claimed that the cost was a
business expense since without such cost she could not have engaged in business.
The court denied the deduction, holding that the particular expense was "the
very essence" of the "personal expense" for which section 262 bars deductions.
The court also indicated that the relation of the expense to the business was
only indirect-it related only to the "circumstances of a profitable occupation;"
6. 23 Fed. Reg. 2244, § 1.162-5 (1958) (superseded May 1, 1967) [hereinafter cited
1958 Regs.'.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967).
8. See Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1089, 1093 n.17 (1964).
9. 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff d mem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
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the expense was for that kind of activity which, "as a matter of common
acceptance and universal experience," is the "direct accompaniment" of business,
or personal activity "applicable to humans generally regardless of occupation."' 0
Education, or at least that education consisting of courses directly related
to a particular trade or business, is clearly not such a personal expense. It might
be argued that a high school education, or a general college program may fall
into the "personal" category; however, that form of education is generally not
claimed as a deduction.
Similarly, capital expenditures are not entitled to deductions. The applica-
tion of the capital analogy to education is derived from the famous dictum of
Justice Cardozo:
Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good
will of an old partnership .. . for many, they are the only tool with
which to hew a pathway to success. The money spent in acquiring
them is well and wisely spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the
operation of a business. 1
However, more realistically, it appears that not all kinds of educational
expenditures should be treated as capital expenditures, although none currently
receive depreciation treatment afforded other "wasting assets." Mechanical appli-
cation of the capital analogy to all education ignores the fact that certain types
of education are of extremely limited duration, and clearly should not be treated
as a capital asset. 1 2 This is especially true for "refresher" type courses.13
Whether any educational expense should be treated as a capital expenditure
will be discussed below, after an examination of the available case law.
C. Carrying on a Trade or Business
A business expense claimed as a deduction under section 162 must be paid
or accrued "in carrying on any trade or business." The Tax Court has thus
stated that whether the taxpayer is so engaged must be the first question con-
sidered.14 The trade or business must be in existence at the time the expense
was incurred, and it is not sufficient that the expense was incurred in acquir-
ing it.1r Similarly, the expense must be incurred directly for the pre-existing
business, and not in an attempt to change it.16 A comprehensive examination of
what constitutes a trade or a business is not appropriate here. Although the
10. Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039 (1939), aff'd "nsen. 113 F.2d 114
(2d Cir. 1940).
11. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-116 (1933).
12. See Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
13. Id. at 309.
14. Woodard W. Hartrick, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 145, appeal dismissed per stlipla-
tion, CCH 1967 St. Fed. Tax Rep. Citator 81, 873 (6th Cir. 1963).
15. Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 511 (1953).
16. See Miron Kroyt, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1665 (1961) (Musician's expense to
learn a new instrument, although similar to the one she had been playing, held nonde-
ductible.).
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issue occasionally arises in connection with research claimed as an educational
deduction, it is collateral to the instant subject.17
Since taxpayer must be engaged in a trade or business at the time the
expense is incurred,' 8 problems have been encountered where taxpayer tempo-
rarily leaves his employment to obtain education relevant thereto. The Com-
missioner has recognized' 9 that the taxpayer does not cease to be employed (and
hence, is still engaged in a trade or business) during an off-duty season or
vacation (such as a teacher's summer) 20 or temporary leave of absence.2 ' A
temporary leave of absence must be either official or pursuant to an informal
arrangement to support the deduction; the taxpayer's mere intent to return to
the same employment, even if he does so return, after an absence solely to obtain
relevant education has been held not a temporary leave of absence to warrant
the deduction.2 2 Yet even where there is a complete severance with the old
employer, taxpayer may still be considered to be carrying on a trade or business
during the transition if he actively seeks new employment of the same type
during that period..
2 3
The problem of a temporary absence from one's business also occurs with
the self-employed. Where there is a total interruption for a substantial period
of time, the taxpayer will be considered to have ceased to be engaged in a
business during the absence, even though he intended to resume the business at
some indefinite future time.2 4 However, in Elliott v. United States,25 a musician,
after four years professional experience, reduced her career to occasional appear-
ances for the next 25 years. Expenses for lessons to enable her to return to her
career on a financially rewarding basis were held deductible; the court reasoned
that during the 25 years taxpayer was an able, qualified and proficient musician.
That point, however, does not seem relevant to the question of whether she was
carrying on a trade or business. Whether one is a member of a profession, and
whether he is engaged in a trade or business, are two separate and distinct
17. See Brooks v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1087 (1958), rev'd, 274 F.2d 96 (9th Cir.
1959); Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1081 (1957); James M. Osborn,
3 T.C. 603 (1944).
18. Mary 0. Furner, 47 T.C. 165 (1966).
19. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69.
20. See, e.g., Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950), accepted by the
Comm'r in I.T. 4044, 1951-1 Cum. Bull. 16; Robert S. Green, 28 T.C. 1154 (1957).
21. See, e.g., Peggy A. King, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 495 (1962).
22. Canter v. United States, 354 F.2d 352 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (The dissent however, de-
clared that the Court's view of a "temporary leave of absence" was too restrictive. Id. at
355-56.). See also Mary 0. Furner, 47 T.C. 165 (1966) where the court ruled that while
an unemployed teacher remains a member of the profession, she is not carrying on a trade
or business.
23. Harold Haft, 40 T.C. 2 (1963).
24. Kaufman v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (Where a disbarred
lawyer engaged in non-legal business for more than 15 years, the court held that the ex-
pense of his reinstatement to the bar was nondeductible.); Henry G. Owen, 23 T.C. 377
(1954) (A lawyer who held a government job for 10 years during which time he did
not engage in private practice was held not to be carrying on a law business during the
10 year period and expense of maintaining his private office was therefore not deductible.).
25. 250 F. Supp. 322 (W.D.N.Y. 1965).
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questions.26 However, Mrs. Elliott did carry on her trade during the 25 year
period, and thus there was no total interruption in her case.
D. Ordinary and Necessary Expense
"Ordinary and necessary," when applied to a section 162 deduction case,
are terms of art. The judicial construction of that phrase is seen in the follow-
ing quotation from a Court of Appeals case:
The expenses were deductible under § 162 ... if they were
"directly connected with" or "proximately resulted from" the practice
of his profession. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153
[1928]. And if it were usual for lawyers in practice similar to his to
incur such expenses they were "ordinary." Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S.
488, 495 [1940]. They were also "necessary" if appropriate and help-
ful. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 [1933].27
Thus, an educational expense is "necessary" if it is appropriate and help-
ful,28 and ordinary if it is a "normal and natural" response, even if not the
most common one, under the specific circumstances.
29
III. THE 1958 REGULATIONS
8 0
The 1958 regulations required a factual determination of the taxpayer's
primary purpose in undertaking the educational expense. Where the primary
purpose was to maintain or improve skills required in his employment (or other
trade or business), or was to meet the express requirement of his employer,
applicable law or regulations as a condition to the retention of his "salary,
status or employment," the expenditure was deductible. But if the education
was undertaken primarily to obtain a new position or substantial advancement
in position, or to fulfill a general educational aspiration or other personal pur-
pose, the expense was not deductible. Similarly, if the education was necessary
to meet minimum requirements for qualification or establishment in the tax-
payer's intended trade or business "or specialty therein," the expense thereof
was not deductible.
The regulations stated that the determination of "primary purpose" was to
be based upon all the facts of the case involved. However, two important indi-
cants were provided. First, if the education was customarily undertaken by
other established members of the taxpayer's trade or business, the taxpayer was
ordinarily to be considered as having undertaken the education primarily to
maintain or improve skill required in his work, and thus to have a deductible
expense. Second, the fact that the education met the express requirements for
26. Mary 0. Furner, 47 T.C. 165 (1966).
27. Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307, 308-9 (2d Cir. 1953).
28. E.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Richard M. Baum, 23 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 206 (1964); Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695 (1962).
29. Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906, 908 (4th Cir. 1950); Evelyn L. Sanders, 19
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 323, 326 (1960).
30. 1958 Regs.
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a new position or substantial advancement in position, was to be a strong indica-
tion that the education was undertaken primarily to obtain such position or
advancement, unless it was expressly required for retention of his present
employment.
Travel, as a form of education, was deemed primarily personal and not
deductible, even if during a sabbatical leave.
Finally, the regulations provided for the deductibility of the cost of travel
away from home, as well as for meals and lodging during such travel, primarily
to obtain education the cost of which is deductible. However, the cost of
incidental personal activities were not deductible. If the travel was primarily
personal, travel expenses were not deductible except for the cost of meals and
lodging during the time actually spent in participating in the deductible educa-
tional pursuit. The primary purpose of the trip was to be determined from all
the facts and circumstances of each case, an important factor being the relative
amounts of time spent in personal and educational activities.
IV. THE CASE LAW
A. Introduction
All the case law available at the time of this writing either preceded, or was
decided under, the 1958 regulations. It will therefore be considered at this point
largely without reference to the 1967 regulations.
B. Primary Purpose-In General
The 1958 regulations required a determination of the taxpayer's primary
purpose in undertaking the education which iesulted in the claimed expense.31
The function of that determination was clearly to exclude personal expenses
from the section 162 deduction, as is evidenced by its effect, as well as by its
language. Since almost any educational pursuit is capable of serving a number
of objectives, business as well as personal, the mere nature of the education will
not in itself indicate whether in a particular case it is a business or a personal
activity. For that reason, the regulations provided that the determination of
primary purpose be made "upon the basis of all the facts of each case.
' '32
According to the case law, determination of primary purpose was a factual
issue, the burden of proof being upon the taxpayer.33 The fact that there was a
dual objective in pursuing the education did not defeat the deduction if the
prinary purpose alone would have supported it,34 since, insofar as deductibility
31. See, e.g., Mary 0. Furner, 47 T.C. 165, 172 (1966).
32. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(a).
33. E.g., James J. Condit, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1306 (1962), aff'd, 329 F.2d 153
(6th Cir. 1964).
34. See United States v. Michaelsen, 313 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1963); Marlor v. Com-
missioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958); Williams v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
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was concerned, it was the primary purpose that prevailed to the exclusion of
any other.
35
C. Education Undertaken to Maintain or Improve Skills
§ 1. In General
The cost of education undertaken primarily for the purpose of maintaining
or improving skills required in one's employment or other trade or business
was the first of two deductible types of educational expenses under the 1958
regulations.36 This category was apparently intended to provide the general
basis for the inclusion of educational expenses within section 162. Education
which complies with such a purpose automatically falls within the judicial def-
inition of "ordinary and necessary;" i.e., appropriate and helpful, 7 since such
education is certainly appropriate and helpful to his business.
§ 2. Custom
Generally, taxpayer could prove that education was undertaken primarily
to maintain or improve skills under the 1958 regulations by merely showing
that "it is customary for other established members of the taxpayer's trade
or business" to do so.38 This was consistent with the definition of "ordinary"
in business expense cases: i.e., a common and accepted activity in such a situa-
tion.3 9 However, the custom test was only one evidentiary source of primary
purpose, and if such a purpose was otherwise proven taxpayer need not have
resorted to it.40 Similarly, the lack of custom did not preclude the existence of
such a purpose, and of itself lead to no inferences. 41 The custom need not have
been followed by the majority of those in taxpayer's position, as long as it
was not "uncommon" among them.42 In at least one case a court recognized,
35. E.g., Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958).
36. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(a).
37. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
38. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(a)(1).
39. This was consistent with the usual definition of "ordinary" in business expense
cases as common and accepted in that type of business. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111 (1933); 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(a); Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69.
See also the following cases where custom has been found: Welsh v. United States,
329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964); and Fortney v. Commissioner, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. I[ 9489
(N.D. Tex. 1964); and William J. Brennan, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1222 (1963) (all three
cases involving IRS agents attending law school); Richard M. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 206 (1964) (claims adjuster attending law school); Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695
(1962) (industrial psychologist with a master's degree taking courses for his doctorate);
Peggy A. King, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 495 (1962) (visiting teacher who is a type of social
worker, studying for a doctorate in education).
40. See e.g., John S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014 (1959).
41. Campbell v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Walter T. Charlton,
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420, 426 (1964); Donald D. Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086,
1089 (1963).
42. Richard M. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206 (1964) (claims adjuster attending
law school). On the other extreme is Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695 (1962) (an industrial
psychologist taking course for Ph. D.) where most of the 40 employees holding a similar
position to plaintiff's already had their doctorate and the rest were then taking courses for
a graduate degree.
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without formal proof, that it is common and usual, and therefore customary,
for members of a certain profession to continue their education throughout their
career.
43
However, there was at least one situation in which custom was held not
to indicate that taxpayer's primary purpose was to maintain or improve his
required skills. In John C. Martin, Jr.,44 the Tax Court noted that, while 60%
of employees in taxpayer's position with the U.S. Patent Office attended law
school, 75% of that group left the Patent Office within a year or two after
completing the law courses. Thus, the education appeared to be taken primarily
to obtain a new position, or, at the least, the fact that such education was cus-
tomary did not, under those circumstances, prove otherwise.45
§ 3. Other tests
Failing to show that the education was customary, taxpayer could still,
under the 1958 regulations, prove by other means that it was intended primarily
to maintain or improve skills required in his employment.46 In doing so he
would be expected to deal with five issues in addition to such proof generally
required for section 162 deductions:
(1) whether skills allegedly maintained or improved were required in his
employment;
(2) whether he was acquiring a new skill, or qualifying himself for a
new trade, business, or specialty;
(3) whether his primary purpose was actually to obtain a new position
or substantial advancement in position, or to fulfill some personal purpose;
(4) whether the education undertaken bore a proximate relationship to
his employment; and
(5) whether he was required to maintain or improve his skills.
Whether Skills are Required
The Commissioner has conceded that skills being maintained or improved
need not be essential to taxpayer's employment. "The skills 'required' by the
taxpayer in his employment or other trade or business are those which are
appropriate, helpful, or needed."147 In light of that position there would appear
to have been no problem with respect to skills that are appropriate and helpful
43. John S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014 (1959) (internist studying psychiatric analysis).
"We do not think it was absolutely necessary that the customariness be established by
testimony .... [lit is sufficient to say that it is in the realm of common knowledge that
many physicians ordinarily continue to enlarge their medical education. . . ." Id. at 1016.
44. 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem., 982, 987 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 363 F.2d 35 (4th Cir.
1966) (aff'd on the ground that the Tax Court was not clearly erroneous).
45. See also David H. Pfeffer, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 785 (1963) (While it was
customary for patent trainees to attend law school, they did so to obtain a new position,
i.e., patent attorney.).
46. See John S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014 (1959).
47. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69, 70.
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rather than essential. However, a problem arose because of the Commissioner's
view that a skill, while not necessarily essential, cannot be maintained or im-
proved unless the taxpayer already possessed it when the education was begun.
The difficulty with that position was a practical matter: whenever the skill
was not in fact essential, but only appropriate and helpful, it was usually a
particular skill new to that taxpayer, and often qualified him for a new business,
specialty or higher position. The commissioner's concession to appropriate and
helpful skills was then largely mooted by his position, under the 1958 regula-
tions, with respect to new skills, specialties and advanced positions.
New Skills and Qualification for New Trade, Business or Specialty
The 1958 regulations made a distinction, in relation to the primary pur-
pose of improving or maintaining skills, between merely a new position (or
substantial advancement in position), and a new trade, business or specialty.
Mere qualification for a new position would not have prevented the deduction,
as long as obtaining such qualification was not the primary purpose in under-
taking the education. However, when the education qualified one for a "new
trade, business or specialty," the Commissioner took the position that the cost
of such education was automatically not deductible under section 162 regard-
less of primary purpose.48
The Commissioner treated acquisition of a new skill similarly to qualifica-
tion for a new specialty--i.e., the cost of education resulting in such acquisition
was considered not deductible regardless of primary purpose. He has been up-
held on this point in some decisions.49 In all these situations, the expenditures
were generally considered to be of a "personal" nature, although some courts
more realistically analogized them to capital expenditures.50
The problem of new skills and specialties under the 1958 regulations is
well illustrated in a number of cases dealing with medical doctors undergoing
training in psychoanalysis.,' Four cases in point are evenly divided in results.
In the first, John S. Watson,52 a physician practiced internal medicine and took
courses in "psychiatric analysis" allegedly to maintain and improve his skill.
48. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(b); Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69.
49. See, e.g., Huene v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (clerk be-
coming a lawyer); Markham v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (psy-
chologist studying psychoanalysis); Miron Kroyt, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1665 (1961)
(musician learning a new instrument, although similar to one already played); Louis
Aronin, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 909, 912 (1961) (NLRB field examiner becoming lawyer.)
50. E.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); James M. Osborne, 3 T.C. 603
(1944). See izfra pp. 209-11.
51. Greenberg v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966); Namrow v. Commis-
sioner, 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914 (1961); Grant Gilmore, 38 T.C.
765 (1962) ; John S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014 (1959). Different issues are involved in Gianakon
v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1966) (taxpayer's claim was not based on main-
taining or improving his skills); Markham v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 505 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (a non-medical psychologist taking psychoanalytic courses); David E. Starrett, 41
T.C. 877 (1964) (psychiatrist claiming psychoanalysis as a medical deduction).
52. 31 T.C. 1014 (1959).
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Clearly such courses were appropriate and helpful to a branch of medicine that
deals largely with diagnoses. The court held that acquisition of the new skill
did not preclude the deduction since the evidence showed taxpayer intended
to use the new skill to improve his general practice and not to become a spe-
cialist in analysis. The court looked to primary purpose, and disregarded the
language in the regulations that indicated qualification for a specialty will
preclude the deduction "in any event." In the second case, Namrow v. Com-
missioner,53 the Tax Court had disallowed the deduction, also looking essentially
to primary purpose, holding that the psychiatrists had acquired what a "large
body of medical opinion" considered to be a specialty (i.e., psychoanalysis).
The Court of Appeals, refusing to say whether taxpayers had acquired a new
skill or just improved an old one, recognized that acquisition of a new skill
in itself should not preclude the deduction; however, it indicated that there was
sufficient evidence to support the Tax Court's determination that the doctors
had intended to practice as specialists. The Court could have again relied solely
on the regulation's provision that "in any event" qualification in a specialty
will be considered a personal expense, but it preferred to base its decision on
primary purpose; it thus gave implicit recognition that the regulations, in
providing that qualification for a specialty automatically precludes the deduc-
tion, are not supported by the statute. In Grant Gilmiore,54 the Tax Court
found again that the practicing psychiatrist did not sustain her burden of proof
in showing that her primary reason for taking training in psychoanalysis was
to maintain or improve her part-time teaching.
The most recent case of the four is Greenberg v. Commissioner.5 5 The Court
there expressly rejected the language in a concurring opinion of the court below
which stated that acquisition of a new skill automatically precludes the deduc-
tion. It also rejected the Tax Court's apparent presumption that acquisition of
a specialty is inconsistent with maintaining and improving one's skill. Again,
the court disregarded the language in the regulations that qualification for a
specialty automatically makes the expense personal:
Most occupations require a bundle of skills. And to the extent that
one is engaged in a learned profession, he must employ a multiplicity
of skills. The fact that what is newly acquired by a taxpayer may be
recognized as a "skill" or a "specialty"-or, as is usually the case,
another group of skills-is irrelevant if the taxpayer's primary purpose
is to add his equipment in carrying bn his pre-existing vocation. 56
Another court reacted similarly to the Commissioner's position:
In a broader attack, the Government argues that because the course of
education undertaken by the taxpayer results in the acquisition of a
53. 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1961).
54. 38 T.C. 765 (1962).
55. 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir.), rev'g, 45 T.C. 480 (1966).
56. Id. at 666. Accord, Marvin L. Lund, 46 T.C. 321, 331 (1966), acquiesced in, 1966
Int. Rev. Bull. No. 46, at 5 (New training need not be in areas identical to prior training.).
191
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new skill, the expenditure is not deductible.... We believe that such
a rule of thumb is wooden, and does violence to the normal interpre-
tation of the law. Resorting to a reductio ad absurdum, such a rule
could reduce every dispute in the area to a search for some skill apart
from the taxpayer's present trade or profession for which his education
prepares him, and if one be found, no matter the intention of the tax-
payer, the deduction would be denied'5
Thus, courts taking the modern view have refused to accept a "wooden"
rule that denies deductibility to all educational expenses which have produced
a new skill or specialty. As will be seen, the new regulations have deleted this
rule.
Nor have the courts consistently followed the Commissioner's position of
automatic denial where the taxpayer becomes fully qualified for an entirely new
profession. Thus, a taxpayer who spent three or more years attending law
school, graduated and was admitted to the bar, has been able to deduct the
expenses of law school where he could convince the court that such expenses
were undertaken primarily to maintain or improve skills required in his "present
employment" (provided he was so employed or otherwise carrying on his trade
or business during the time the expenses were incurred).,; These cases have
clearly ignored the automatic denial of the regulations and Revenue Ruling,50
and have continued to turn upon the primary purpose doctrine.00
It is true that one obtaining a law degree to maintain or improve his work
in another profession, acquires some skills which are not directly relevant to his
present work. While it is generally conceded that, on the whole, his performance
is improved, it is claimed that he has done more than merely maintain and
improve his required skills. The Commissioner would require him, for example,
to take only those legal courses immediately relevant to his work rather than
obtain a degree. One court has provided a realistic response:
Furthermore, as all who have attended law school know, a legal
education is not a series of isolated subjects; it is rather a progression
of courses that are interrelated and built upon one another. It is very
difficult to understand and appreciate any single subject fully if it is
cut off from the others. 6 '
57. Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597, 600 (N.D. Ohio 1962), aff'd, 329 F.2d
145 (6th Cir. 1964).
58. Some of the cases allowing law school expense deductions are Welsh v. United
States, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964), aff'g 210 F. Supp. 597 (NJ). Ohio 1962) (IRS em-
ployee); Campbell v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (medical examiner);
Frank Kilgannon, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 619 (1965) (accountant); Richard M. Baum, 23
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206 (1964) (claims adjuster); Donald D. Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1086 (1963) (civilian Air Force employee).
59. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 69.
60. See also Marvin L. Lund, 46 T.C. 321, 332 (1966), acquiesced in, 1966 Int. Rev.
Bull. No. 46 at 5, where the court said "As we held in Watson (31 T.C. 1014 (1959)), it is
not fatal to the allowance of a deduction that the amounts are paid for specialized courses
if the purpose for which the courses are taken is to enhance existing skills and not to engage
in a new specialty."
61. Campbell v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 941, 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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Thus, the fact that taxpayer acquires a new profession is not inconsistent
with a primary purpose of maintaining and improving skills required in his
present job. The case before the court just cited involved a medical examiner
who had begun his legal education not intending to secure a degree. He sought
the degree only after finding that he could not gain complete understanding
from the isolated courses, and was prevented from taking some important sub-
jects without certain prerequisites. The cost of that education was not a "per-
sonal" expense, as the regulations would characterize it. The Court found a
direct relationship to his business. This was clearly a busines expenditure. The
new regulations have recognized that these kinds of expenditures are not merely
personal, and states that non-deductible educational expenditures are either
personal or capital (or a combination); unfortunately, the Commissioner has
not made a determination of which types of education resemble capital assets
rather than personal.
The courts, for the most part, have refused to follow the provisions in the
1958 regulations that would require automatic denial of deductions for the
cost of education which qualifies for new trade, business or specialty. They have
rather applied the primary purpose approach. It is suggested that the courts
will, and should, continue to disregard the automatic denial provisions of the
new regulations. However, with the deletion of the primary purpose doctrine
the courts will no longer be able to purport to follow the regulations.
To Obtain New or Advanced Position or for other "Personal Goals"
The 1958 regulations provided, and the cases have held, that when educa-
tion is undertaken primarily to obtain a new position (or substantial advance-
ment in position) the expense of such education is not deductible under section
162.02 This is true even though the education may also maintain or improve
skills required to present employment.
As in all tax cases, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that he is
entitled to the deduction, and bears the burden on all issues relevant to his
claim; the Commissioner's determination is presumed correct. 63 Here, since the
question before the court is a factual one-i.e., determination of taxpayer's
primary purpose-the burden is particularly heavy. The issue of credibility is
often critical.
64
The 1958 regulations provided that the fact that education fulfills minimum
qualifications for a new position will be an "important factor" indicating that
such education was undertaken primarily for that purpose. 65 However, that fact
alone did not prevent the deduction, even where taxpayer actually left his old
62. E.g., Gianakon v. Commissioner, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Miem. (1964), aff'd per curiam,
358 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1966).
63. E.g., Long v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1960).
64. See Dunnaville, Conflict Grows as More Taxpayers Claim Deductions for Law
Studies, 23 J. Taxation 350 (1965).
65. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(b).
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position. Yet, it did weigh heavily in the court's determination. 0 If the taxpayer
was not substantially qualified in his present position at the time he took
education which so qualified him, the courts generally considered his primary
purpose to be qualification rather than maintaining or improving his skills, in
accordance with the test in the regulations.
67
Where the court found that the education was undertaken primarily to
obtain an advanced position, taxpayer might still have been allowed the deduc-
tion if such advancement was not substantial, and if the duties of both positions
were closely related.68 The fact that taxpayer expected, as an incident to the
education, advancement, promotion or salary increase did not negate a primary
purpose to maintain or improve his skills.6 9 Indeed, any education which im-
proves one's skills is likely to result in an expectation of some personal benefit.70
On the other hand, the fact that taxpayer remains with the same employer 7'
or in the same profession72 is not inconsistent with the acquisition of a new
position. For example, the Tax Court has held78 that an attorney who obtained
a Master's degree in tax law pursuant to an agreement with two other attorneys
to open a law firm, did so not merely to improve his skills, 4 but primarily to
obtain a new position (i.e., partnership in the new firm). This was so even though
he was already a fully qualified and practicing lawyer, and was clearly improving
his skills.75
Education undertaken primarily for a personal purpose will similarly
produce a non-deductible expense. 6 The 1958 regulations had specifically
provided that "general education aspirations" constitute such a purpose.77 But
in any event, a personal motive will not defeat the deduction unless it is the
66. See John C. Martin, Jr., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 982, 986 (1965), afl'd, 363 F.2d
35 (4th Cir. 1966); William F. Rylaarsdam, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 707 (1966); Ralph A.
Fattore, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1093 (1963).
67. E.g., John Murphy, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 664 (1964); James J. Engel, 21 CCII
Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1962).
68. Milton L. Schultz, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1372 (1964). See also Marvin L. Lund,
46 T.C. 321, 332 (1966) (dictum).
69. E.g., Fortney v. Campbell, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9489 (N.D. Tex. 1964); Frank
Kilgannon, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 619, 625 (1965); Milton L. Schultz, 23 CCH Tax Ct,
Mem. 1372 (1964); William J. Brennan, 22 CCI Tax Ct. Mem. 1222 (1963); Donald P.
Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1963). But see, Louis Aronin, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mom.
909 (1961). See also 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(e), example 6; Stuetzer, New Cases on Travel,
Education, Help Draw Line Between Personal and Business, 11 J. Taxation 346, 348 (1959).
70. See Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695, 701-702 (1962).
71. E.g., Condit v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964); Sandt v. Commis-
sioner, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962).
72. E.g., Joseph T. Booth III, 35 T.C. 1144, 1148 (1961).
73. Id.
74. The court distinguished those cases in which the attorney had merely taken a
short refresher tax course. Id.
75. See also Gianakon v. Commissioner, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 965 (1964), aff'd,
358 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1966) in which the court held that a psychiatrist who undertook
psychoanalytic training did so primarily to obtain the directorship of a clinic.
76. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(b); see, e.g., Jack B. Wheatland, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
579 (1964); Daniel Kates, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 1396 (1962).
77. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(b); see also Zeev Melamid, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 818
(1966).
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primary reason for undertaking the education7 8 Thus, one who obtained a
degree while maintaining or improving his skills would not necessarily have
been prevented from taking a deduction, 79 nor would an educational activity
have been deemed personal because a less expensive alternative was available;80
but if the cost of such activity clearly outweighed the possible benefits, that fact
would have been taken into account against the taxpayer.
8 1
Relationship of Education to Trade or Business
The expense claimed in a section 162 deduction must be "directly con-
nected" with the business of taxpayer.82 The courts often phrase this require-
ment in terms of proximate relationship83 and one writer has stated that
the prevalent standards usually indicate that the education must
benefit the business directly. Thus, it must make the teacher a better
teacher or the lawyer a better lawyer.84
The courts generally examined the alleged relationship closely in education
cases. At times, the absence of a necessary relationship is clear as in the case
of a lawyer who attended a meeting of the International Law Association in
Yugoslavia in an attempt to do something about the "world situation."8 5 On
the other hand, there was seldom any difficulty in finding the requisite relation-
ship where the education consisted of a short refresher course intended to keep
taxpayer abreast of developments in his field.86 More often, however, the
presence or absence of a relationship is not so apparent. Thus, the courts have
divided in allowing deductions for law school to accountants87 and Internal
78. E.g., Fortney v. Campbell, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. fI 9489 (N.D. Tex. 1964); Donald
P. Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1963)
79. See supra note 58 for cases allowing law school expense deductions. See also
Sabino F. Ciorciari, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 784 (1963); Donald C. Hester, 22 CCH Tax
Ct. Mer. 501 (1963); Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695 (1962); Peggy A. King, 21 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 495 (1962); James E. Lane, 21 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 989 (1962).
The new regulations specifically adopt this rule. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1967).
80. "Where two options for qualifying to maintain a position or status or for im-
proving his skills in his present position are open to an individual, the fact that he chooses
the more expensive or time-consuming course does not control the deductibility of the
expenses paid for obtaining the additional education." James J. Engel, 21 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1302, 1306 (1962).
81. See Maude A. Schinnagel, 21 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 577 (1962). See also Treas.
Regs. § 1.162-5(e) (2), example 3 (1967).
82. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928).
83. E.g., Alexander P. Reed, 35 T.C. 199 (1960).
84. Shaw, Education as an Ordinary and Necessary Expense in Carrying On a Trade
or Business, 19 Tax L. Rev. 1, 15 (1963).
85. Alexander P. Reed, 35 T.C. 199 (1960).
86. See Bistline v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 802 (E). Idaho 1956), aff'd, 260
F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1958); Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953); Pacific
Grape Products Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1097, 1104 (1952), rev'd on other grounds,
219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955); Alexander Silverman, 6 B.T.A. 1328, acquiesced in, VI-2 Cum.
Bull. 37 (1927).
87. Compare Frank Kilgannon, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 619 (1965), and Walter T.
Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420 (1964), with Huene v. United States, 247 F. Supp.
564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), and Anthony E. Spitaleri, 32 T.C. 988 (1959), acquiesced in, 1960-2
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Revenue Service employees.88 It is often difficult, however, to determine from
the court's language whether, in denying a deduction, it is doing so because of
a lack of proximate relationship or because of a "personal" primary purpose.89
Individually, the courts often considered the specific duties of the taxpayer's
employment 0 as well as its general nature or orientation. 9 ' On the whole, it is
clear that the courts have divided in their search for proximate relationship
with respect to specific occupation-education relationships.
Moreover, the education must be related to the business of taxpayer, not
merely his profession. Since a business, in this context, generally requires a
profit motive, the education must therefore offer potential or actual benefit to a
profit-seeking venture or employment. 92 If the education is only partially related
to such a trade or business, there will be an allocation of expenses for deduction
Cum. Bull. 7, taxpayer's appeal dismissed, CCH 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. Cit. at 82613
(1st Cir. 1960).
However, since Spitaleri was not decided under the current regulations, it is no longer
controlling. See Walter T. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 426.
88. However, there is only one Tax Court case-which was the first dealing with
IRS employees-denying a law school deduction in this situation. See James J. Engel, 21
CCI= Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1962). The court's position on proximate relationship is not
clear since it held that taxpayer's primary purpose was to obtain a new position. All sub-
sequent cases in point have allowed the deduction except two based on jury verdicts as to
primary purpose. Welsh v. United States, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964); Fortney v. Camp-
bell, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. fI 9489 (N.D. Tex. 1964); Milton L. Schultz, 23 CCIH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1372 (1964); William J. Brennan, 22 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1222 (1963). The two jury
cases are Cowan v. United States, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. gi 9199 (S.D. Fla. 1966); and Jaffe
v. United States, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9514 (S.D. Fla. 1966). Thus, this issue with respect
to IRS agents and law school appears, for the most part, resolved.
89. See, e.g., James J. Engel, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1962).
90. Note the detailed discussion of duties in, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 250 F.
Supp. 941 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Richard M. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206 (1964); Sabino
F. Ciorciari, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 784 (1963); Donald P. Frazee, 22 CCII Tax Ct. Mem.
1086 (1963).
91. Thus, it was held that a medical examiner's position has important legal aspects,
and a deduction for law school expenses was allowed in Campbell v. United States, 250
F. Supp. 941 (ED. Pa. 1966). Similarly, in Walter T. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420
(1964) the relationship of law to the problems of accounting was recognized.
A proximate relationship was also found between law school and the job of a civilian
Air Force employee whose duties involved, inter alia, formulation of regulations, statements
on proposed legislation, and conferences with other agency personnel including legal staff.
Donald P. Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1963). This case has been called by one
commentator "perhaps one of the most strained interpretations of the regulations" in the
area. Dunnaville, Jr., Conflict Grows as More Taxpayers Claim Deductions for Law Studies,
23 J. Taxation 350, 353 (1965). But see Louis Aronin, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 909 (1961),
probably wrongly decided, on an analogous factual setting to that in the Frazee case.
In Peggy A. King, 21 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 495 (1962), a proximate relationship was
found between a Ph. D. in education and the position of visiting teacher, a type of social
worker. Similarly, in Sabino F. Ciorciari, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 784 (1963) a housing
assistant, who made rent collections, dealt with many welfare problems, and acted as a
liaison officer with other public agencies, was allowed to deduct the cost of a master's degree
in public administration.
On the other hand no proximate relationships were found in the following cases: Adel-
son v. United States, 342 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1965) (teacher's travel); Zeev Melamid, 25
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 818 (1966) (B.S. degree and travel bureau business); Donald Kates,
21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1396 (1962) (head of lithograph department taking accounting
courses).
92. E.g., Morris S. Schwartz, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 725 (1961).
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purposes. 3 By the sounder view, educational expenses will not be allocated
solely because some of the courses taken as part of an educational program,
when considered alone, have no direct connection to the business. If the entire
program is an integrated whole and, as such, bears a proximate relation to the
business, all expenses thereof will be deductible. 94 Nor will the relationship be
negated by the availability of a less expensive course of study so long as the
one chosen is "ordinary."9 5
Requirement to Maintain or Improve One's Skill
Under the 1958 regulations, the expense of education undertaken for the
primary purpose of either maintaining or improving skills or meeting express
employer requirements was deductible.9 6 Thus, if taxpayer's primary purpose
was to maintain or improve his skills, the education need not 'have been
required.9 7 Yet the Tax Court had occasionally used language which would
indicate otherwise. For example, in one recent case the Court noted that the
law school studies undertaken by petitioner were "neither required nor neces-
sary for maintaining or improving [his) . . . skills in his employment. .... Y)98
While that statement is dicta, since the evidence supported the conclusion that
petitioner's primary purpose was not to maintain and improve his skills, it
reflects an inaccurate view of the law under the 1958 regulations. Education to
maintain or improve need not have been required or necessary, but only
appropriate and helpful.99 It may be that the statement was given insufficient
thought, as the Tax Court, at least since 1963, has apparently recognized and
applied the more liberal interpretation of "appropriate and helpful" to the
regulations. 00
93. E.g., John J. Tyne, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1112 (1966).
94. See, Campbell v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 941, 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966), and quote
in text accompanying supra note 61; see also Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597
(N.D. Ohio 1962), aff'd, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964).
95. See supra note 80.
96. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(a).
97. E.g., Ralph A. Fattore, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1093, 1095 (1963).
98. William F. Rylaarsdam, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 707, 709 (1966).
99. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
100. See e.g., Richard M. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 206, 209 (1964); Donald
P. Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086, 1088 (1963).
Cases during the early 1950's, despite the Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933)
definition of "necessary," applied the term rather strictly to education: e.g., Richard H.
Lampkin, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 576 (1952); Manuel C. Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3 (1951). As
early as 1953 a court of appeals recognized that such a strict application of "necessary"
to education was not realistic, and that there was in fact a moral necessity or professional
duty to "keep sharp the tools" of one's trade; the court expressly applied the "appropriate
and helpful" test. Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
In 1962 the Tax Court apparently lapsed into the stricter interpretation of "necessary"
in Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962), over a dissent severely criticizing the decision on
that ground. Id. at 180. See Shaw, supra note 84, at 13. The court also appeared to disregard
the 1958 regulations. See Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business
Expense, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1089, 1104 (1964). However, on appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals the parties agreed to remand for "no decision" entry. Id. at 1090 n.7.
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D. Meeting Express Requirements
Under the 1958 regulations, the second type of deductible expense was for
the cost of education undertaken primarily for the purpose of "meeting the
express requirements of a taxpayer's employer, or . . . of applicable law or
regulations, imposed as a condition to the retention . . . of . . . salary, status
or employment."''1 1 Such a requirement must have been "imposed primarily for
a bona fide business purpose of the taxpayer's employer and not primarily for
the taxpayer's benefit."' 0 2 If the education was necessary to meet the minimum
requirements for qualification or establishment in taxpayer's intended trade or
business, the expense thereof was deemed personal. 0 8
The cases indicate three major problems:
(1) At what point is the requirement "express"?
(2) When is there a bona fide business purpose?
(3) Where taxpayer's agreement to fulfill the condition was required to
commence employment, was his primary purpose to retain such
employment or to qualify therefor?
§ 1. When is a Requirement Express?
With respect to the first problem, the Tax Court recently held that
It is not necessary that a taxpayer be threatened with immediate
dismissal unless he takes certain training in order for the expendi-
tures . . . to be deductible.1
04
That case involved aircraft personnel whose employer was gradually shifting
from use of propeller planes to jets. The personnel, skilled in their position on
the older aircraft, required additional training in order to perform substantially
the same function aboard jets. They faced no immediate threat of job loss, but
the court found it was sufficient that they could reasonably anticipate an
eventual threat. The court apparently was not using the common meaning of
"express requirement," but was rather recognizing that practical and realistic
necessities create similar requirements, albeit not "express," and should there-
fore be treated as though they were express.' 05
101. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(a)(2). The necessity of expenditure has elsewhere been
held to require a treatment not indicated by the nature of the asset involved. See Commis-
sioner v. Bagley & Sewell Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955) (A loss incurred in posting U.S.
government bond as performance security under a contract was held not to be a capital
loss.).
102. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(a).
103. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(b).
104. Marvin L. Lund, 46 T.C. 321, 332 (1966), acquiesced in, 1966 Int. Rev, Bull.
No. 46, at 5.
105. Accord, Rhonda Fennell, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 489 (1953) which was decided
before the 1958 regulations. There, taxpayer, a school librarian, was required to have at-
tained an amount of post-graduate education which varied with the number of students at-
tending her school. Due to an anticipated increase in the school's enrollment she attended
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Since this category of deductible expenses continues in the 1967 regulations,
this case is of current significance. If the court's criterion was in fact one of
practical necessity, as it appears to be, we may expect an appropriate reversal
of the court's position in cases involving professors' research.1 6 It is well known
in the academic world that a college professor is "expected" to engage in
research, and direct or indirect pressures force him to do so. That his position
and right to salary increments may depend thereupon is reflected in the popular
phrase that he must either "publish or perish."' 0 7 Yet the Tax Court, in the
recent case of Harold H. Davis,08 refused to treat such research expenditures
as required on the ground, essentially, that there was no express requirement.
The Commissioner's stipulation to a remand for a "no decision" entry'0 9 in.the
Davis case may be some indication of the Treasury Department's willingness to
accept the more liberal construction of "express requirements'"-i.e., a require-
ment in a practical sense, although not express.
§ 2. Bona Fide Business Purpose
The issue of bona fide business purpose generally is confined to cases in
which taxpayer claims that he was required to undertake travel as a form of
education. The 1958 regulations"10 provided that such travel was ordinarily to be
considered as personal. The courts generally examined the activities engaged
upon and the itinerary of travel to determine whether the motive was in fact
primarily personal (i.e., a sightseeing trip). Thus, the Tax Court has indicated
that where taxpayer's travel activities did not differ from those of any other
tourist of his age, his trip may be considered primarily personal.-" However,
the fact that the places visited are also common tourist attractions may not
have defeated the deduction. Thus, an art or geography teacher may take
special interest in so-called tourist attractions,"x2 and a foreign language instruc-
tor will find a direct connection between his work and certain popular activities
such as movies and plays."L3
summer school to obtain the credits she expected would be necessary. She was allowed the
deduction. The Lund case, 46 T.C. 321 (1966), is of course a major extension of Fennell.
See also Devereaux v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1961) where education was
held to be required because taxpayer had a "moral obligation" to take it, having induced
his employer to retain him on the basis of such a promise.
106. See generally, Wolfman, supra note 100.
107. See, e.g., the dissent in Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175, 180 (1962). See also Shaw,
supra note 84, at 16; Wolfman, supra note 100, at 1106; Comment, Deductibility of Educa-
tional Expenses, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 547 (1954).
108. 38 T.C. 175 (1962).
109. Wolfman, supra note 100, at 1090 n.7.
110. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(c).
111. E.g., In Adelson v. United States, 342 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1965), and Fugate v.
United States, 259 F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Tex. 1966), the travel was allegedly intended to
maintain and improve skills, but was denied for lack of direct connection with employment.
112. E.g., Evelyn L. Sanders, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 323 (1960).
113. Rev. Rul. 64-176, 1964-1 Cum. Bull. 87. But see Cross v. United States, 222 F.
Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 336 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1964), on remand, 250 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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Usually, where travel is claimed to be required, alternate means to meet
the requirement are provided by the employer.'1 4 However, the availability of al-
ternatives does not vitiate the required nature of the course chosen." 65 Nonthe-
less, the travel must be imposed for a bona fide business purpose, and not
merely for the employee's benefit." 6 The court is thus obligated to determine
whether the travel does in fact bear a direct relationship to the employment,
and is not bound by the employer's view.117 Even if travel is one of the methods
of meeting the requirement, and is so accepted by the employer, the absence
of a necessary relation to the job will prevent deduction.118 There are two bases
upon which such a holding may be justified: first, that travel was primarily
imposed for taxpayer's benefit, or second, that taxpayer's purpose was not
primarily to meet the requirement. In either event, the expense will not have
proximately resulted from the taxpayer's trade or business, and should therefore
not be deductible.
§ 3. Employment on Condition
The third problem area involves the situation in which taxpayer is hired
upon the condition that he fulfill certain educational requirements within a
stipulated period of time. The Commissioner appeared to take the position,
under the 1958 regulations, that any education so required was necessarily a
"minimum requirement" of the employment. In one of the first cases of this
type, Robert M. Kamins,"19 decided prior to the 1958 regulations, taxpayer was
offered a position as research associate, but was told he would have to substan-
tially complete his Ph. D. degree before a contract could be given since the
degree was the normal requirement for such a position. When only his doctoral
dissertation remained to be completed, he was given a one year contract. After
the second annual contract he took an educational leave of absence to complete
the dissertation. His appointment to a permanent position was directly related
to his completion of the degree. The Tax Court held the dissertation expenses
nondeductible because Kamins was, at the time, not "fully and completely
114. E.g., Dennehy v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1966); Evelyn L. Sanders,
19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 323 (1960).
115. In the landmark case of Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 1950),
the court held that, where two alternatives exist, if the chosen course was one a "reasonable
person would normally and naturally make under the specific circmstances, it would
suffice" even if most persons in fact chose the other alternative. In Hill the expense of
summer school was held deductible. But the same language was applied in holding travel
expenses deductible in Evelyn L. Sanders, 19 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 323, 326 (1960).
In Dennehy v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1962), aff'g 20 CCII Tax Ct. Mem.
750 (1961), taxpayer, a math instructor, was required by contract to teach two out of three
summers; he was prohibited from engaging in gainful employment during the third summer,
but was to use it for travel, reading, resting, or self-improvement. The reasonable interpre-
tation of this provision in his contract is one of required vacation, with suggested activities.
Dennehy's European trip was correctly held nondeductible.
116. 1958 Regs. § 1.162-5(a).
117. Adelson v. United States, 342 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1965).
118. Richard Seibold, 31 T.C. 1017 (1959).
119. 25 T.C. 1238 (1956).
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established in his chosen profession.' 120 Two years after Kamins, the 1958 reg-
ulations were adopted and one of the leading cases in this area was decided. In
Marlor v. Commissioner12' taxpayer was hired on an annual, temporary basis
as a tutor, and was told that within five years he must become an instructor,
requiring a Ph. D., or would not be rehired. The Tax Court, over a dissent by
Judge Raum, dissallowed the deduction for Ph. D. expenses, but the Court of
Appeals reversed per curiam on the basis of the dissent. Judge Raum had found
that Marlor had a "dual objective" in undertaking the education: first, to
qualify for the permanent staff, and, second, to retain his position as tutor.
Since the second objective was "much more immediate" the deduction was held
proper. The same situation is found in teacher certification cases in which state
regulations require that within a specified period of time a teacher must achieve
a particular type of certificate, usually requiring post-graduate education. Marlor
has been followed in holding the cost of such education deductible. 2 2 However,
in one case, expenses to advance from "emergency" status, under which taxpayer
could be hired only if no fully qualified teachers were available, were dis-
allowed.1 23 The Tax Court held that taxpayer was not yet a qualified teacher
and did not possess a teaching position since she would not be rehired if a fully
qualified teacher were available. Taking a somewhat more liberal approach, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in another case found that a degree was
"required" because taxpayer, having induced the university, his employer, to
retain him in part by promising to complete the degree, had a "moral obligation"
to do so.1 24 The Tax Court was able to avoid facing that problem in Laurie S.
Robertson,12 5 where taxpayer was told, when hired, that he would be expected
to obtain his Ph. D. within a couple of years. Only after taxpayer had been
employed did the rules change to absolutely require the degree by the fifth year.
Thus was the Court able to hold that the education was undertaken for the
primary purpose of meeting employer's express requirements, rather than to
meet the minimum qualifications for the position. However, by distinguishing
the Kamins case, the Tax Court was able to implicitly indicate its dissatisfaction
with the Marlor doctrine.
The Tax Court recognizes that the right to salary increments is a vital
incident of one's position, and the cost of education required solely to retain such
rights is fully deductible, and not personal.
126
120. Id. at 1240.
121. 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958), rev'g 27 T.C. 624 (1956).
122. United States v. Michaelsen, 313 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1963); Lonnie R. Lenderman,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 511 (1963).
123. Lonnie R. Lenderman, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 511 (1963).
124. Devereaux v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1961).
125. 37 T.C. 1153 (1962), acquiesced in, 1963-1 Cum. Bull. 4.
126. Ruth D. Truxall, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 726 (1962). This would appear to over-
rule a prior case of the same court on this point; however, the earlier case was affirmed by
the court of appeals. Thomas P. Dennehy, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 750 (1961), aff'd, 309
F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1962). But the court of appeals appeared to rely more heavily on the
personal nature of the educational activity (travel) ; thus, its opinion on this point may be
dictum.
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The problem of conditional employment has also arisen in another line of
cases dealing with patent attorneys and related occupations. A number of large
private corporations offer training programs for patent agents. Upon entrance
in the program, the "patent trainee" must usually agree to attend law school,
and upon completion thereof is promoted to patent attorney or patent agent.
Seven cases of this nature have been decided, 12 7 and in only one, Williams v.
United States,128 was the deduction allowed. The District Court in Williams
relied on the Marlor doctrine of dual objective and the test of the most immedi-
ate and pressing purpose; it indicated that the reasoning of the other six cases
was inconsistent therewith, including the Court of Appeals decision of Sandt v.
Commissioner.2 9 Sandt had purported to distinguish Marlor on the basis of the
factual finding of primary purpose. The Tax Court provided a reply to Williams
in Owen L. Lamb,'130 holding that the entire educational program must be
considered, and that the primary purpose must be determined as it existed when
the decision was first made to undertake the education. That purpose, the Tax
Court continued, was clearly to qualify for patent attorney, a new position.
Marlor was distinguished because there the taxpayer was already "substantially
qualified" for his position.' 3 ' If the Second Circuit passes on the merits of this
issue in the appeal of Lamb, 32 the result will be significant since the Williams
court is within its jurisdiction, and it is the same court which decided Marlor. If
it distinguishes Marlor, as did Sandt and Lamb, the Williams rationale would be,
in effect, overruled.
V. TH 1967 REGULATIONS
A. The Provisions133
The key factor in the new regulations, adopted May 1, 1967, is found not
in the intent of the taxpayer or in the function in fact served by the education
undertaken, but rather in the inherent nature of the education and its potential
functions.
127. Owen L. Lamb, 46 T.C. 539 (1966), appeal pending, 374 F.2d 256 (1967); Wil-
liams v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); John Lezdey, 23 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 485 (1964); Robert H. Montgomery, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 599 (1964); David H.
Pfeffer, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 785 (1963); see also Sandt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 111
(3d Cir. 1962), aff'g Bernard W. Sandt, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 913 (1961), and Roger A.
Hines, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1028 (1961).
The case of John C. Martin, Jr., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 982 (1965), aff'd per curiam,
363 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1966) may appear to be similar, but is not in point. Martin was a
patent examiner for the U.S. government; he was not required to attend law school, but
did so allegedly to maintain and improve his skills. The Tax Court did not so find, and
therefore denied the deduction.
128. 238 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
129. 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962).
130. 46 T.C. 539 (1966).
131. Id. at 544.
132. The government's motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of improper venue
has been denied. 374 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1967).
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967).
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In brief, deductibility is determined by applicability of four classifications.
If the education falls into either of two non-deductible classifications, the expense
thereof is automatically denied deductibility. These two non-deductible classifi-
cations include education which
(1) is required of the individual in order to meet the minimum
educational requirements for qualification in his employment or other
trade or business; or
(2) is part of a program of study being pursued by the individual
which will lead to qualifying him in a new trade or business.
Since the taxpayer has the burden of proof, he must prove the inapplica-
bility of these two categories. Thus, as to the first, he must show that he had
previously met the minimum educational requirements for the position he held
at the time of undertaking the education. The regulations provide that the fact
taxpayer is already performing services in the particular position does not
establish that he has met the educational requirements therefor. However, once
he has in fact met them, he will be treated as continuing to meet them even if
they are changed. The regulations further set out detailed guidelines for
determination of minimum educational requirements of positions in educational
institutions. As to the second non-deductible category, relating to qualification
for a new trade or business, qualification for a new specialty-if such does not
constitute a new trade or business-will not preclude the deduction; nor will
attainment of an academic degree.
If the taxpayer successfully proves that neither of the two non-deductible
categories apply, he must then prove the applicability of one of the two deduct-
ible categories. These categories include education which:
(1) maintains or improves skills required by the individual in
his employment or other trade or business; or
(2) meets the express requirements of the individual's employer
(or applicable law or regulations) as a condition to the retention by the
individual of an established employment relationship, status, or rate
of compensation.
The regulations provide that the first of these two categories includes
"refresher courses or courses dealing with current developments" as long as
neither of the non-deductible categories apply. The second deductible category,
relating to an employer requirement, may be used only if the requirement is
"imposed for a bona fide business purpose of the individual's employer." How-
ever, except as to travel as a form of education, that issue is usually not in
dispute and evidence thereon is generally unnecessary.
The new regulations have somewhat liberalized the deductibility of travel
as a form of education. They provide that such travel is deductible if the major
portion of activities during such travel directly maintains or improves skills
required in the individual's employment or other trade or business, provided
that neither of the non-deductible categories apply.
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Finally, the new regulations provide for the deductibility of the cost of
travel away from home, as well as meals and lodging during such travel, pri-
marily to obtain education the cost of which is deductible. However, the cost of
incidental personal activities is not deductible. If the travel is primarily per-
sonal, travel expenses are not deductible except for the cost of meals and lodging
during the time actually spent in participating in the deductible educational
pursuit. The primary purpose of the trip is to be determined from all the facts
and circumstances of each case, an important factor being the relative amounts
of time spent in personal and educational activities. These provisions concerning
travel away from home are substantially the same as those in the 1958 regu-
lations.
B. Analysis
§ 1. In General
As noted above, the most significant change between the two sets of regula-
tions is the deletion of the primary purpose test. The four categories, two
allowing deductibility, and two denying it are substantially the same.
§ 2. Changes
Of those changes made, the major differences, apart from deletion of the
purpose factor,13 4 are:
1. Qualification for a new specialty no longer is treated the same as quali-
fication for a new trade or business.
2. The provisions with respect to travel as a form of education have been
somewhat liberalized. While such travel used to be considered "generally
personal," it is now deductible if the major portion of activities during
the period of travel is of such a nature to directly maintain or improve
required skills. These new provisions bring the regulations into sub-
stantial compliance with the case law.1' 5
3. Since the test of primary purpose no longer exists in the new regula-
tions, the need for evidence of custom no longer exists to prove such a
purpose and has therefore been omitted from the regulations. Never-
theless, it will probably continue to be relevant as evidence that such
education is generally recognized as in fact maintaining or improving
certain skills.
§ 3. Provisions Allowing Deductibility
The two categories describing education, the cost of which is deductible,
have a clear basis in law. Education which maintains or improves one's business
skills are necessarily appropriate, helpful and ordinary. Expenses for required
134. See supra pp. 187-88.
135. See supra pp. 199-200.
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education are deductible under case law holding that required expenses are
deductible even if they would otherwise be of a capital nature.
§ 4. Excluding Provisions
In General
The two exclusionary provisions of the 1967 regulations (one relating to
qualification for a new trade or business and the other to meeting the minimum
educational requirements of one's employment or other trade or business) must
be based, as must all of the interpretive regulations, upon the appropriate stat-
ute. As indicated above, there are a number of general statutory requirements
for a section 162 deduction. It is in these that the regulations must have their
foundation.
Qualification for New Trade or Business
One exclusionary provision precludes a deduction for educational expenses
if the education qualifies taxpayer for a new trade or business.136 Examining
first the statutory requirement that taxpayer be engaged in a trade or business
at the time such expense is paid or incurred, it becomes clear that the basis of
the exclusion does not lie therein. This requirement would prevent taxpayer
from deducting the educational expenses which are not being used for the
benefit of the present business, but are rather, intended as preparation for a
new trade or business. Thus, if the accountant attends law school, not to assist
his accounting practice, but to become a lawyer, the requirement of carrying
on a trade or business would apply. Under the 1958 regulations the primary
purpose test was employed to implement this requirement. However, under the
1967 regulations, the accountant who undertakes legal education (and obtains
a degree therein) to assist him in his accounting practice would also be denied
the deduction, although the expense is in fact one of his current business.
3 7 It
is therefore clear that the requirement of carrying on a trade or business cannot
serve as a basis for this provision.
Another statutory requirement is that the expense be an "ordinary and
necessary" one of the trade or business. The fact that education may inciden-
tally qualify one for a new trade or business does not indicate that it is not
also ordinary and necessary to the current business. In fact, the new regulations
would preclude the deduction even if it is proven and conceded by the Com-
missioner that the education is ordinary and necessary, within the judicial
meaning of that phrase, to the current business. Thus, the requirement that an
expense be ordinary and necessary is also not the basis of the exclusion.
The exclusion must therefore be based upon the assumption that such
education is either personal or a capital asset. Clearly the education is not
necessarily personal. However, even if it is proved to be directly based upon a
136. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (1967).
137. Id. § 1.162-5(b) (3) (example 1).
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business need, and therefore not personal, it will be denied under the new
regulations.
The legal basis of the exclusion then, if one exists at all, must be founded
upon the concept of capital assets. Some courts have explicitly taken that posi-
tion.138 The result of such a conclusion, however, is to leave the educational
expense in a type of legal limbo-clearly business related, but neither deductible
nor depreciable-since no court has yet allowed depreciation treatment of
educational expenses.'
39
The exclusion of capital expenditures from expense treatment is provided
by section 263 of the Code. Capital expenditures so excluded are "permanent
improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or
estate." 40 The regulations thereunder further define such expenditures as "paid
or incurred (1) to add to the value, or substantially prolong the useful life, of
property owned by the taxpayer, such as plant or equipment, or (2) to adapt
property to a new or different use.' '141 Since it is often not clear whether partic-
ular education is being used in fact to adapt oneself to a new trade, or merely
to increase one's ability in his current trade, the regulations would deny the
expense deduction for any education capable of adaptive functions regardless of
whether it is so used. Under the 1958 regulations, it was first determined
whether the education was intended to serve such a function. It seems clear
under the first classification of the section 263 regulations that educational
expenses would not be permanent improvements to property "such as plant or
equipment." Further examples in the regulations indicate that education is not
the type of asset thereunder covered.' 42 In addition, it is clear that the Com-
missioner does not so consider it, for if he did, he would be compelled to hold
that a master's degree in chemistry is such an improvement for the chemist; but
a deduction for the expense of such an improvement would clearly be allowed.
Thus, the Commissioner is concerned with the possible adaption to a new trade
or business. In his apprehension over that issue, he has attempted to create a
blanket rule which includes within its scope not only those expenses validly
excluded, but also those which traditionally have been, and should continue to
be, a bona fide business expense deduction.
In short, it is submitted that the fact that education may qualify one for
a new trade or business, when it is not so used, is irrelevant as long as it has a
bona fide function in the on-going business. Whether an asset is capital or
ordinary, depends not upon the potential function of the asset, but upon the
purpose for which it is intended and the use to which it is put in fact.'4 8
138. E.g., James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603,605 (1944).
139. See, e.g., Huene v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
140. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 263(a) (1).
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-l(b) (1958) as amended, T.M. 6794, 1965-1 Cum. Bull.
128, 133, T.D. 6548, 1961-1 Cum. Bull. 63, 66-67 (Emphasis added.).
142. See id. § 1.263(a)-2(a).
143. See, e.g., du Pont & Co. v. United States, F.2d 904, 909 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Com-
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The statute excluding capital expenditures from deduction treatment, sec-
tion 263, and the regulations thereunder, compel a determination of whether
education was intended, at the time undertaken, to be used in an adaptive
function, or in an already existing business. Education which is not undertaken
to adapt to a new trade or business is not a capital expenditure, even though
it might have been so under a different factual setting. Thus, the exclusionary
provision, if it is based upon the capital asset concept, is an invalid interpre-
tation of the law.
If the education is not based upon that concept, as has been demonstrated
above, it is not supported by any other interpretation of the statute, and is
therefore still invalid. Thus, regardless of its purported foundation, the exclu-
sion should not be allowed to stand as it is.
Meeting Minimum Educational Requirements
The other category of non-deductible educational expenditures under the
1967 regulations involves education which meets the "minimum educational
requirements for qualification in [taxpayer's] ...employment or other trade
or business."' 44 Again, the "carrying on" a trade or business concept cannot be
the basis of this exclusion. After one is hired on the condition that he complete
the required education, and begins to do so while earning an income from the
job, he is within the judicially defined scope of carrying on a trade or business.
The Commissioner may be taking the position that taxpayer undertook the
education, not to maintain or improve his skills, but to enter a new profession,
and was merely fortunate enough to be hired first and allowed to qualify later.
If that is the case, the primary purpose provision of the 1958 regulations would
have precluded the deduction. Under the new regulations, intent in undertaking
the education is immaterial to the deduction. Thus, even if taxpayer undertook
the education for the sole reason of retaining the current job, the deduction
would be denied since it meets the minimum educational requirements. For this
reason, it is clear that the requirement of carrying on a trade or business at
the time of the expense is not the basis of this exclusion.
Similarly, one may reject the requirement of "ordinary and necessary" as
the foundation for the exclusion. In cases involving this situation, there is
generally no question that the education was proximately related, appropriate,
and helpful to, as well as ordinary in, the vocation involved. At any rate, that
such education meets the minimum requirements for a position certainly does
not logically lead to a contrary inference.
Again, we are left with the remaining statutory prohibitions relating to
personal and capital expenditures. It is apparent that such education is not
necessarily personal. One meets the requirements of his position, and fulfills the
missioner v. Bagley & Seawall Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955); Midland Empire Packing
Co., 14 T.C. 635 (1950).
144. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2) (1967).
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conditions of his employment, in order that he may produce an income. If he
has already commenced employment-which he must have done in order to be
carrying on a trade or business-he undertakes the education to retain his
current income-producing position. In no way can it be denied that the
educational expense is a business expense rather than a merely personal one.
As to whether such education is a capital asset, it appears that certain
types of basic education, such as law school, resemble an intangible capital asset
in many respects.145 For example, the useful life of such education far exceeds
one year. However, it is clear that an asset which is ordinarily of a capital
nature may be treated as a business expense where it is not "investment"
property, but is rather required.146 Where an employee is required to take
certain education to retain his job, although the education will fulfill the mini-
mum educational requirements of such job, the education is a requirement of
producing current income in his on-going employment position. As such it
warrants business expense treatment. The fact that it fulfills minimum require-
ments is incidental thereto.'
47
Thus, while in some instances education may be considered similar to a
capital asset, where it arises in the kinds of situations here involved, it produces
a business expense and not a capital expenditure.
The regulations' blanket exclusion of such education is then without basis
in any statutory requirement.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. Business Expenses Under the Regulations
Those expenses heretofore allowed as deductions under section 162 should
remain deductible, and the primary purpose test should be continued to be
employed, in conjunction with the new, instead of the 1958, regulations, so that
the four categories are applied only in accordance with the taxpayer's primary
purpose. In this manner, the deductibility of educational expenses will allow the
professional to deduct many of the true expenses of his business, which had
previously been denied to him.
B. Other Educational Expenses
For those educational expenditures clearly connected to the business which
do not fall within the business expense deduction, defined by the regulations as
modified above, the taxpayer is left with a non-deductible and non-depreciable
business expenditure. It is solely with these non-deductible educational expendi-
tures that we deal in these following sections.
145. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 143.
147. E.g., Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958).
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§ 1. Capital Treatment
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as interpreted and applied by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue works a harsh and unfair discrimination
against the professional, 148 whose primary assets include not buildings and
machinery, but "human capital."'149 The education which he must acquire, per-
haps three or four years of professional schooling, is a capital asset, albeit
intangible, under all common definitions of that term. In terms of the common
tests, it has a useful life of more than one year; it often qualifies taxpayer for
a new and different job; it increases his earning capacity.150 Yet education has
traditionally been denied depreciation treatment under the Code, apparently on
the ground that it does not have an ascertainable useful life period.' 51 There
are two answers to' that position. First, it does have a useful life period that
can readily be calculated with reasonable accuracy, and second, even assuming
such a period cannot be estimated with sufficient certainty, statutory amortiza-
tion may nevertheless be provided.
The period over which the educational asset will be useful is absolutely
limited by the "business life" expectancy of the taxpayer. 152 Further, the educa-
tion will continue to be of value throughout his entire professional career,
although in a steadily decreasing fashion. Thus the useful life of the asset can
be calculated from the "general experience of the industry; "'5 z i.e., the retire-
ment age of those in taxpayer's industry. It should be noted that precise accu-
racy of a useful life determination is not required; reasonable accuracy is
sufficient.' 54 Nor can it be validly argued that the value of the education does
not steadily decrease as the practice and experience of the professional increases.
In the case of the lawyer, for example, who has been practicing for 30 years,
the contribution of his three or four years in law school, while unquestionably
148. See, e.g., Heckerling, The Federal Taxation of Legal Education: Past, Present,
and Proposed, 27 Ohio St. LJ. 117, 139 (1966): "Our Government has too long delayed in
doing the fair and just act of placing professional people on the same basis as business and
industry." (Foonote in original omitted.).
149. The concept of "human capital" is explored in Bowman, Human Capital:
Concepts and Measurements, inEconomics in Higher Education 69 (S. Mushkin ed. 1962).
150. For an extensive discussion on the case law distinctions between capital expendi-
tures and ordinary and necessary business expenses, see 4A J. Mertens, Federal Income
Taxation § 25.20 (J. Riordan ed. 1966). See also Shaw, Education as an Ordinary and Neces-
sary Expense in Carrying on a Trade or Business, 19 Tax L. Rev. 1, 8 (1964).
151. See Shaw, supra note 150, at 8.
152. "For the purpose of section 167 the estimated useful life of an asset is not
necessarily the useful life inherent in the asset but is the period over which the asset may
reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the
production of his income." Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-i(b) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6712,
1964-1 Cum. Bull. 106.
153. "If the taxpayer's experience is inadequate, the general experience in the industry
may be used until such time as the taxpayer's own experience forms an adequate basis for
making the determination." Id.
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956), as amended, TD). 6452, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 127.
See also Fall River Gas Appliance Co., 42 T.C. 850, 856 (1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 515 (1st
Cir. 1965), where the court said it could not arrive at any "scientifically accurate" estimate
of useful life, but would do the best possible with the evidence before it. See generally,
4 J. Mertens, supra note 150, § 23.01 at 7.
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providing him with the "basic" tools of his trade, is hopefully largely obsolete.
That which he learned in school, for the most part, he has learned many times
over in practice; in addition, much of the knowledge he then acquired, in terms
of substantive law, would be currently out of date and useless in practice. Thus,
such education is truly a "wasting asset," which declines in value until its
useful life ends when taxpayer retires from professional life.
The second argument against the traditional approach assumes that the
useful life cannot be determined with sufficient accuracy. Statutory amortiza-
tion is allowed in a number of situations in which a useful life period is prac-
tically impossible to calculate. In each such situation, the expenditure is made
for a capital asset directly related to the trade or business, and Congress has
declared that taxpayer should be allowed to recover its cost. Thus, section 174
of the Code allows taxpayer to elect to treat research and experimental ex-
penditures as either expenses or capital expenditures. Section 173 provides such
an election for expenditures to establish or increase the circulation of news-
papers and other periodicals. 55 By the same reasoning and policy considera-
tions, the professional should be allowed statutory amortization of educational
expenditures which are directly related to his trade or business. In fact, in the
case of educational expenditures, the reason for allowing statutory amortization
is even stronger. Since education is a type of "human capital," it can never be
the subject of a "sale or other disposition" upon which a gain or loss may be
recognized.15 6 Therefore, unlike most other capital assets, including goodwill,
its cost will not be recovered through the gain or loss provisions of the Code. The
amortization is therefore necessary to allow cost recovery. Such amortization
could be spread over any of three periods of time: the calculated life of the
taxpayer's business career, some specific statutory period, or a period deter-
mined by agreement between taxpayer and the Commissioner. Since we can
determine the life of this asset with reasonable statistical accuracy, it would be
theoretically most desirable to spread the deductions over that period. However,
since the individual cases would tend to vary widely, an arbitrary "business
life" expectancy should be provided; thus, retirement could be deemed at age
60, and the deduction based upon the period calculated therefrom. At the
same time, taxpayer could be allowed to elect between the declared life calcula-
tion and an individual agreement with the Commissioner, as he is allowed by
section 165(d) of the Code. The Commissioner's power to determine such a
period would not thereby be terminated, and the possibility of more closely
approximating the true useful life would be increased.
The kind of education which should be subject to the capitalization
proposed here must be directly related to the trade or business of taxpayer.
Thus, high school expenses should not ordinarily be deductible, unless they in-
155. See also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 248, relating to election to amortize organiza-
tional expenses.
156. Id. § 1001.
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dude vocational courses which directly relate to the trade or business of tax-
payer when he begins work. Then, only expenses attributable to such courses
would be deductible. General college courses should be deductible in a similar
manner insofar as they relate directly to taxpayer's profession, the allocation
being based upon the distribution of credit hours.157 In general, the expenses
of professional and business schools would be fully deductible. But in all cases
no deduction would be allowed until taxpayer enters the related profession and
derives an income therefrom. The relation between the education and career
would in part depend upon the relative time and cost spent in each. Thus, the
time spent in business may be so short as to warrant a presumption that only
part of the education was so employed, the remainder being used for personal
purposes; in that case an allocation would be made.
One writer has suggested that perhaps a percentage limitation should be
placed on the yearly deduction, in terms of yearly income, or the total cost of
the education being capitalized.' 58 This, however, would again place the pro-
fessional in a different category from other businessmen who are not so limited
in depreciating capital assets. It should be noted that since the amortization
is spread throughout the taxpayer's presumed entire "business life," the occur-
rence of unreasonably large yearly deductions would be greatly reduced. In
addition, only that education which is directly related to taxpayer's profession
would be eligible for capital treatment.
§ 2. Deduction
It can also be argued that educational expenses should be subject to an
election by the taxpayer to either deduct or amortize, as are circulation 59 and
research and experimental expenditures160 In both of the latter situations, the
useful life of the asset is generally longer than the life of educational assets;
in addition, the amount of the expenditure is often much more substantial.
Nevertheless, expense treatment is permitted for these costs. While this sug-
gestion warrants serious consideration, it is submitted that strict amortization
is more desirable. Due to the "personal" taint which the Commissioner tends
to attach to educational expenditures, stretching the deduction over the years
during which income is derived therefrom would largely eliminate the conten-
tion of a personal expense, since the deduction is taken only against directly
related income and only to the extent of the relationship during the year in
question.
However, a deduction should still be allowed for educational expenses
157. One author has suggested a weighting of education, according to its value to future
earnings. Thus, a general college course may be 75% deductible, professional post-graduate
education or vocational training, 100% deductible, and high school, 25% deductible. Goode,
Educational Expenditures and Income Tax, in Economics in Higher Education 281 (S.
Mushkin ed. 1962).
158. Id. at 281.
159. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 173.
160. Id. § 174.
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which fall within section 162. The new regulations would, under the amortiza-
tion plan suggested above, be appropriate, if implemented by the primary pur-
pose test. But for two reasons, those regulations, in the absence of provisions
for capital treatment and for a primary purpose test, are currently unsound.
First, as mere interpretive regulations, they have no force of law, although when
reasonable they are often relied upon by the courts. Construction of statutes
is a duty of the courts, to be independently exercised. The role of the court is
particularly important here. The primary purpose doctrine has not only re-
ceived the approval of the courts and of the Commissioner, but is based upon
judicial statutory construction. 161 The Commissioner is now attempting to say
that the courts have erred in their interpretation of the law, and that he has
erred by applying that interpretation in the 1958 regulations. While he may,
of course, take such a position in an interpretive regulation, it in no way in-
validates the courts' prior construction. The new regulations are also improper
because, being interpretive rather than legislative, they are by nature retroac-
tive, and as such drastically alter a long-standing policy. Further, the regula-
tions would deprive taxpayers of a deduction which has previously been ad-
ministratively and judicially approved. That function properly belongs to
Congress. Thus, the regulations should be discarded by the courts since they
are an attempt to overrule the case law and usurp the function of Congress.
VII. SUMM-ARY
1. In dealing with the new regulations, the courts should follow either of
these approaches:
(a) give effect to the regulations, but implement them by the primary
purpose test, and allow the taxpayer to amortize educational expendi-
tures of a capital nature under section 167 of the Code, if the tax-
payer is able to provide sufficient evidence of the useful life of such
education, such as proposed herein, or, alternatively,
(b) deny effect to the regulations, as an incorrect interpretation of the
law and an invalid attempt to to change it.
2. The Code should be amended to allow capital educational expenditures
to be amortized over the useful life of the asset, as defined above, and deducted
from directly related income in accordance with the amortization scheme sug-
gested herein.
3. The regulations should be liberally applied in favor of the professional
taxpayer in view of present inequities otherwise existing in the Code.'
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161. See Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953); Hill v. Commissioner,
181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
162. Senate approval of a liberal interpretation given to the regulations with respect
to educational expenses is found in S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1958),
1958-3 Cum. Bull. 922, 1032.
